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In this paper, we demonstrate the application of different sensor location optimization strategies
in drinking water distribution networks, with aims such as maximization of distribution
network coverage with redundancy and optimization of contamination source identification.
We present and compare results of these different approaches applied to hydraulic models of a
real drinking water distribution network in the Netherlands. The selection of results presented
in this paper illustrates that it is important for a water company to decide what it wants to get
out of water quality sensors before installing them in the field. Different optimization criteria
for their spatial configuration result in very different configurations, which may perform well
for one purpose but much less so for another. However, some sets of objectives are compatible
in the sense that a configuration optimized for one objective also performs well for the other.
INTRODUCTION
The most commonly applied strategies for optimal water quality sensor placement in drinking
water distribution systems are based on the philosophy of contamination early warning systems
[e.g. 1,2 and references therein]. These strategies aim to minimize the number of people
affected in case of a deliberate contamination of drinking water in the distribution system, and
provide a valuable tool. A number of factors which are usually not taken into account, including
the response strategy to the identification of a contamination event, the fallibility of sensors and
changes in network configuration (valve manipulation) and operation, may affect the results of
these strategies. Since the quickness and effectiveness of a response is generally also a function
of the location of the contamination event (both source and first detection), knowledge on the
response strategy should also be part of the sensor placement optimization methodology.
Besides contamination early warning systems, there are several other reasons for placing
water quality sensors in distribution network, including process control and monitoring,
regulatory monitoring, etc. These may require a different approach to optimization of the sensor
network in terms of sensor locations.
In this paper, we demonstrate the application of different sensor location optimization
strategies in drinking water distribution networks, with aims such as maximization of
distribution network coverage with redundancy and optimization of contamination source
identification. We present and compare results of these different approaches applied to
hydraulic models of a real drinking water distribution network in the Netherlands.

CONTAMINATION SCENARIOS, OPTIMIZATION CRITERIA AND
APPROACH
Methodology
A hydraulic model (EPANET-MSX [3]) is used to calculate the transport of contaminants
through a distribution network. Postprocessing of calculated transport from and to all nodes
allows a complete consideration of the problems treated here.
Contamination scenarios
In the network model discussed below, a set of potential contaminant injection points is
defined, which is a subset which is constructed by optimizing for an equal number of
connections surrounding each potential injection location. An equal probability of contaminant
injection is assumed at each potential injection point and at each hour. The same node set is
used as the set of potential sensor locations.
Optimization objectives
Detection likelihood and time to first detection
Mean detection likelihood and mean time to first detection are commonly applied objectives for
sensor placement optimization, which are included here for comparison. Ostfeld et al. [2] note
that detection likelihood and time to first detection are criteria which oppose each other in the
sense of sensor location optimization. However, this assertion is closely related to their choice
to not include non-detected events in their analysis. When, for example, a large penalty time
would be given to each non-detected event, a detection time optimized sensor configuration
would move towards a configuration optimized for detection likelihood. A reasonable choice
for this penalty time might be the estimated time for a contamination to surface by other means
(e.g. customer complaints). However, not all events will surface in this way. A different
approach is to take the maximum residence time of the water in the injection point at the time of
injection as the penalty time. This approach is followed in this work.
Network Coverage and redundancy
Network coverage is defined here as the fraction of the network which from which water is
sampled during a predefined observation window. It is closely related to detection likelihood,
but allows the user to choose in what way the fraction of the network is expressed, e.g. in
network length, number of connections, number of connected costumers, etc. Redundancy is
introduced by demanding concurrent observation of a network segment by at least n sensors.
Redundancy allows water companies to, for example, start preparatory actions at the first
detection and escalate when a confirmation from a second sensor is obtained.
When using a (partially) skeletonized network model, as is the case here, it is important to
express network coverage in terms of a parameter which is conserved in the skeletonization
process, such as number of connections, rather than a parameter which is not, such as pipe
length or volume.
Contamination Source Identifiability
The most important tool for determining the source area of a contaminant is an accurate
hydraulic model of the distribution network, in which a contaminant can be traced back in time
from its point of observation to all the parts of the network where it might have originated.

Several approaches to this backtracing or backtracking have been presented in the literature
[e.g. 4,5]. Our approach is based on combination of forward traces. Note that any alternative
backtracing algorithm which also takes into account the dynamic flow field renders equally
suitable backtraces for the following.
The backtrace of from a single node in the network forms the complete potential area of origin
for a contaminant which was observed at this node. This backtrace contains all dynamics and
variability of the flow field throughout the day. It does, however, not contain the stochastic
variations in demand and resulting variations in the flow field. These may have a significant
influence on backtracing in specific parts of the tertiary (reticulation) network (see [6]), but are
expected not to be important outside these areas. When one assumes that multiple observations
(in space and/or time) of an anomaly by sensors constitute the same contamination event, their
combination can be used to narrow down the potential area of origin in the distribution network.
This becomes a simple exercise when the backtraces are considered in a binary way. For a set
of observations, the set of nodes which constitutes the potential contamination source area S is
formed by the intersection of the backtraces of the individual observations Ti for the same
and/or different sensor locations at the same and/or different observation times:
S = T1  T2  T3 … (1)
The design objective for this optimization objective, contamination source identifiability, is the
minimization of the mean minimum potential source area size (pipe length) which can be
determined for the contamination scenario set. This means that for each scenario, the minimum
non-zero potential source area size is determined (which can occur at any time after the start of
the contamination event), and the mean for all scenarios is taken as the performance parameter.
Note that this objective is computationally very expensive. Therefore, the results below have
been computed for a single contamination time (midnight) at each of the potential source nodes.
Optimization approach
Optimization is performed using a genetic algorithm implemented in the inspyred library [7]. In
order to verify the performance of the algorithm, several comparisons against brute force global
optimizations have been performed for simple networks.
RESULTS
Distribution network
The approaches describe above are applied to a drinking water distribution network models, see
Figure 1. It is a skeletonized version of a distribution network in The Netherlands (part of the
Vitens Innovation Playground [8]).

Figure 1: Skeletonized distribution system with in and outgoing water flows (red arrows) and
100 potential contamination/sensor locations (blue circles).
Sensor networks and performance
Overview
For all optimization criteria discussed above, optimal sensor configurations have been
computed for the test network. For all of these optimal configurations, the performance of the
sensor network with respect to each of these criteria has been determined. The results are
presented in Table 1, and discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. A uniformly
distributed (over the connections) set of 15 sensor locations has been included for comparison.
It is clear from the table that almost all optimized designs (the exception is design CR3 for
objective coverage n=1) perform better on each of the individual objectives than the uniformly
distributed configuration.

applied optimal
sensor configuration

Table 1: Overview of sensor network design performances for the objective they were
optimized for and the other objectives. The uniform configuration is non-optimized. Higher
performance values are better for the detection likelihood and coverage, lower is better for time
to first detection and contamination source identifiability (CSI).
performance with respect to objective
scenario detection
time to
coverage and redundancy
CSI
likelihood first
(fraction of all connections)
(km)
detection
n=1
n=2
n=3
(hours)
DL
0.50
9.22
0.54
0.34
0.26
262
TFD
0.45
9.13
0.52
0.40
0.22
272
CR1
0.39
11.80
0.62
0.33
0.21
272
CR2
0.40
11.11
0.55
0.48
0.29
263
CR3
0.38
10.28
0.41
0.26
0.31
268
CSI
0.43
9.67
0.47
0.30
0.16
238
uniform
0.26
12.48
0.44
0.25
0.11
285

Detection likelihood and time to first detection
Optimal sensor locations for 15 sensors with respect to mean detection likelihood and two
different approaches to the mean time to first detection are shown in Figure 2. When nondetections are ignored, i.e. when events that are not observed by any sensor do not contribute in
a negative way to the performance indicator of the network (cyan circles in Figure 2), a
configuration with many sensors close to the water sources and transport mains is found. When
non-detections contribute a penalty detection time which is equal to the local maximum
residence time (large magenta circles in Figure 2), a configuration which is much closer to that
of the maximum detection likelihood configuration is found, both geometrically and in terms of
performance for both objectives (see Table 1). This shows that these objectives do not
necessarily oppose each other, as was noted in [2].
Network coverage and redundancy
The sensor configurations optimized for coverage in terms of numbers of connections with 15
sensors and single or multiple (n=2, n=3) redundancy for the test network and their
performance are shown in Figure 3. Requiring (multiple) redundancy in the sensor network
results in a very clear contraction of the configuration and the covered area.

Figure 2: Optimal sensor configurations for 15 sensors with optimization for detection
likelihood (likelihood, blue dots), time to first detection ignoring non-detected events (timing,
small cyan circles), and time to first detection using the local maximum residence time at the
contamination site as time penalty in case of non-detection (timing mrt, large magenta circles).

Figure 3: Optimal sensor locations for maximum network coverage in terms of numbers of
connections without (n=1, small blue circles) and with redundancy (n=2, cyan circles, n=3,
large magenta circles).
Contamination source identification
The sensor configuration for 15 sensors optimized for contamination source identifiability is
shown in Figure 4 (blue dots). For comparison, the optimal configuration for the detection
likelihood objective is also shown (cyan circles). The two configurations are relatively close,
both in terms of sensor locations and in terms of performance with respect to the different
objectives.

Figure 4: Optimal sensor locations for maximum contamination source identifiability (CSI) and
detection likelihood.

The quantitative values of the CSI performance of the different designs listed in Table 1 do
not appear to be very different. However, these scores are diluted by the assignation of the full
network as the potential source area in case of non-detection.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Detection likelihood and network coverage appear, at first glance, to be the same parameter.
However, detection likelihood has a focus on the network, whereas network coverage can be
defined to have a focus on the consumers. This results in a different configuration, with a
reduced performance for the other objective. Requiring redundancy in the network coverage
may have its clear uses for water companies (for example, it allows water companies phase
their response to detected contaminants as a function of the number of detections), but
obviously the number of connections which can be covered with the same number of sensors is
much lower.
Minimizing the time to first detection is a very useful approach when one want to protect a
population. Using the maximum residence time for an individual node as a penalty time when
optimizing for this objective presents a more balanced approach than ignoring non-detections,
as has been done in the past. The resulting sensor configuration is quite different, and much
closer to that for the detection likelihood objective.
The optimization for contamination source identifiability is a novel criterion, which
directly connects to mitigative and corrective measures taken in case of a contamination. This
criterion results in a qualitatively similar sensor configuration compared to the detection
likelihood objective for the case which was studied here.
This selection of results illustrates that it is important for a water company to decide what it
wants to get out of water quality sensors before installing them in the field. Different
optimization criteria for their spatial configuration result in very different configurations, which
may perform well for one purpose but much less so for another, as is illustrated in Table 1.
However, some sets of objectives are compatible in the sense that a configuration optimized for
one objective also performs well for the other.
Hydraulic models generally play a central role in the optimization of sensor placement. The
validity of their computations strongly depends upon accurate and up to date information on the
network, which is often not fully available (e.g. unregistered valve status changes). This is a
point of concern, which requires attention.
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